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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this research project is to examine the equity
lending practices of unregulated mortgage companies in Boston,
Massachusetts from 1985 to 1990.

The scope of the inquiry is limited to

the lending practices by regulated banks and unregulated mortgage
companies in Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan from 1985 to 1990.

The

research is done in response to the so-called second mortgage scam that
affected minority residents in Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan.
To review these lending practices, four major questions are
answered in this report.
1)

The questions are:

What are the lending patterns of Boston's major banks in

Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan?
2)

What finance structure enables unregulated mortgage companies

to operate?
3)

Who are the unregulated lenders in violation of established

lending standards, and in what neighborhoods do they operate?
4)

What efforts are being made at a city and state level to

promote industry standards and prevent future foreclosures?
The research indicates that Boston's regulated banks have redlined
the areas of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan, creating a demand for
home mortgage and home improvement financing that was met by unregulated
lenders.

Some of the unregulated mortgage companies, particularly the

Resource Companies, have packaged loan products that are very burdensome
to the borrowers.

The consequence to homeowners for borrowing from

these companies was often foreclosure.
The key findings of this report are as follows:
•

Boston's major banks have redlined Roxbury, Dorchester and
Mattapan.

•

There was a disproportionate amount of loans contracted by
homeowners with unregulated mortgage companies in Roxbury,
Dorchester and Mattapan.

•

Available information on interest rates and terms of loans
from some unregulated mortgage companies operating in
Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan were usurious (in excess of
30-percent).

•

The foreclosure rate on properties with a mortgage company
claim was 42.2 percent. Another 27.9 percent were at risk
of foreclosure. These figures are based on the review of
Suffolk County Registry of Deeds records of 660 properties
in Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan.

•

This practice cheats the homeowners of the equity they have
built in their homes, and has a destabilizing effect on the
neighborhoods.

City officials and community leaders are seeking remedies to the
situation.

Their efforts included regulating mortgage companies in

Massachusetts as of January 1, 1992; imposing a moratorium on
foreclosures to provide an opportunity to review the loan agreements;
and establishing a multi-million fund for the purposes of providing home
mortgage and home improvement financing in Roxbury, Dorchester and
Mattapan.
While these remedies provide short-term solutions to the problem,
the structure of the banking industry might promote such lending
practices over the long-term.

Long-term solutions, such as strict

enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act, need to be addressed to
prevent this situation in the future.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION
The "American dream" is synonymous with homeownership.

For some,

the expression inspires a vision of family life in the suburbs; for
others it represents an urban lifestyle.

In either case, the ability to

purchase and maintain a home remains at the center of the ideal.
A home represents the single largest purchase of most households
in the United States.

Few households are able to purchase a house

without some form of long-term financing.

Consequently, homeownership

is dependent on the availability of credit.
While regulated banking institutions are the most common resource
for home financing, their products are not evenly distributed throughout
all neighborhoods.

Residents of inner-city neighborhoods, particularly

those with a high percentage of minorities, often find that regulated
banks (italicized words are defined in the glossary) do not provide
financing in their neighborhoods.

Other institutions, such as

unregulated mortgage companies, may supply the unmet demand for
financing opportunities, but often at a higher cost to the borrower.
The higher cost of borrowing from mortgage companies is supposedly
justified by the higher risk associated with inner-city housing stock
and risk of loaning to low- and moderate-income households (Couture
1992).

The constraints imposed on regulated banks, such as disclosure

requirements and interest rate caps, are not applicable to unregulated
mortgage companies.
Inherent in the unregulated environment is the potential for
abuse.

While mortgage companies provide a service to homeowners by
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allowing access to the equity in homes, some mortgage companies have
packaged loan products that are very burdensome to borrowers, and that
often result in foreclosure.
Statement of Purpose
This research project addresses the issue of home financing
opportunities in selected neighborhoods of Boston, Massachusetts.

The

scope of the inquiry is limited to the lending practices by regulated
banks and unregulated mortgage companies in Roxbury, Dorchester and
M.attapan from 1985 to 1990.

The research is in response to a "second

mortgage scam" that is alleged to be practiced by mortgage companies in
these neighborhoods.
Major Questions
To review these lending practices, four major questions are
answered in this report.
1)

The questions are:

'What are the lending patterns of Boston's major banks in

Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan?
2)

'What finance structure enables unregulated mortgage companies

to operate?
3)

'Who are the unregulated lenders in violation of established

lending standards, and in what neighborhoods do they operate?
4)

'What efforts are being made at a city and state level to

promote industry standards and prevent future foreclosures?
Objectives of the Research
To begin the research, Chapter Two, Selected Neighborhood
Characteristics, will present a brief demographic profile of Roxbury,
Dorchester and Mattapan.

The objective of the profile is to describe
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the median income and racial mix of the neighborhoods most affected by
mortgage company lenders.

Chapter Three addresses the first major

question by assessing lending patterns of Boston's major banks.

The

objective is to compare the lending patterns in Roxbury, Dorchester and
Mattapan with other neighborhoods of similar socio-economic
characteristics.

Chapter Four answers the second question through a

brief explanation of the relationship between regulated banks and
unregulated mortgage companies.

Chapter Four also answers the third

question in that it describes the lending patterns of mortgage companies
in Boston's selected neighborhoods, Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan.
The first objective of Chapter Four is to explain the financial
structure that enables mortgage companies to operate.

The second and

most important objective of this chapter is to analyze the loan products
of unregulated mortgage companies, and determine the geographic
distribution of these products.

Chapter Five addresses the final

question of local governmental attempts to seek an equitable solution to
the problem of very burdensome loans by mortgage companies.

The

objective is to provide a sample of the legislation and programs
introduced by Boston city officials at the time of this writing to
remedy the situation.

Chapter Six offers conclusions and

recommendations.
Organization
For each chapter of this research project, the objective is
restated, and the data sources are presented, followed by the
methodology used to analyze the data.
each chapter.

The major findings will conclude

lfethodology
The methods used in this research project include a review of
published research on redlining in Boston, Massachusetts, by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Boston (Bradbury 1989) and the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (Finn 1989).

Mortgage company lending patterns were

determined by a review of an unpublished research document by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Munnell and Browne 1991), and other
unpublished data.

Identification of legislation and program initiatives

directed at preventing future home foreclosures was made by a review of
newspaper articles on the topic.

The author recognized that news items

constitute secondary data and are sometimes prone to editing and
typographical errors.

Therefore, further information on laws and

programs was compiled and verified through telephone interviews with key
informants.
Data Sources
Data used in this research project include published and
unpublished material.

Chapter Two, Selected Neighborhood

Characteristics, is based on statistics from the U.S. Census.

Chapter

Three, Lending Practices of Boston's Major Banks, is based on data
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston (Bradbury 1989), and the
Boston Redevelopment Authority (Finn 1989).

These two published studies

were based on Community Reinvestment Act and Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act reports required of regulated banks.
Financing Opportunities:

Chapter Four, Alternative

Mortgage Companies, is based on published and

unpublished materials.

Published material include essays on mortgage

markets by Fannie Mae.

Unpublished data include those gathered by the
4
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Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and the Union Neighborhood Assistance
Corp. on unregulated lenders from the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds
records.
BACKGROUND
The so-called "second mortgage scam" occurred during the latter
part of the 1980s in the neighborhoods of Roxbury, Dorchester and
Mattapan.

The lending practices of a few mortgage companies, sometimes

working with contractors, have come under extreme criticism by community
groups, legislators and community officials for their lending practices.
These mortgage companies include, as this study will show, the Resource
Companies (operating under several names, such as Resource Funding,
Inc., Resource Lending, Inc., Resource Financial Group, Inc., Resource
Services, Inc., and Resource Mortgage Corp), Growth Mortgage Corp., and
Chrysler First Credit Corp.

The contractors include U.S. Window Corp.,

and Vinyl Distributors of New England Inc., and others.

The criticisms

have included failing to research the borrower's ability to repay the
debt, charging usurious interest rates, for fraud, and for violations of
truth-in-lending laws.

Many homeowners in Boston have lost their homes

as a consequence of doing business with these companies.

These mortgage

companies are called "hardlenders" by the media and many community
groups to differentiate them from other unregulated mortgage companies.
The Boston media, including television and newspapers, offered
considerable coverage of the situation during the summer of 1991 as
victimized homeowners began to make their stories public.

Neighborhood

community organizations and city officials began to research the lending
practices of these companies, and to hold public meetings to educate

6

low- and moderate-income families about the high risk associated with
doing business with them.

These activities encouraged more victimized

homeowners to come forward, making it possible to learn of the lending
patterns used by these companies and to determine the extent of their
lending activities.
While the initial research was made available to the public by
community groups, city officials began to conduct educational meetings
to inform residents of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan of the names and
practices of the hardlenders.

One such meeting, sponsored by the

Mattapan Civic Improvement Association, was held at the local police
station on June 24, 1991.

Diane Watson, Commissioner of Elderly

Affairs, and Diane Modica, Commissioner of Consumer Affairs and
Licensing, City of Boston, took the opportunity to expose the pattern
used by the loan originators to obtain the borrower's signature (Modica
1991).
Modica reported a pattern that typically begins with a contractor
arriving at the home, pointing out the need for repairs.
a persuasion based on fears:

This is often

weak steps might cause an elderly

individual to fall and break a hip, creating extensive medical bills.
The contractors usually attempt to gain the trust of the homeowner by
completing a small repair (under $500) of quality construction and on
schedule.
Once trust has been established, the contractor typically returns
with a more extensive list of repairs, and many documents for the
homeowner to sign.

Included in the document package are:

1) completion

certificates, which the homeowner signs, in advance, to authorize that
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the work has been completed satisfactorily, and 2) loan agreements,
often in violation of truth-in-lending laws.

Modica reported that high

pressure sales tactics are commonly used, such as the offer of
discounted prices if the agreement is signed immediately.
Many victims reported that papers, attached to a clipboard,
covered what they later discovered were the interest rate and loan
agreement section of the document.

Additionally, it was reported that

the three day right to rescind section of the contract, required by
truth-in-lending laws, was missing or obscured.

After a contract was

signed, the contractor seldom completed the work to a satisfactory
level.

The borrower, of course, was still obligated to pay the loan.
In a law suit filed by the Massachusetts Attorney General against

the Resource Companies , the victimized homeowners testified that loan
originators falsified the contracts.

Borrowers were told they were

receiving a long-term (15 year) agreement, with interest rates between
15- and 18-percent annually.

In fact, the agreements were high interest

(20-percent or more), short-term (two years), interest-only loans, with
balloon payments due at the end of the term.

The court record states

that loan originators often promised the borrowers that these agreement s
were only temporary and necessary to begin the home improvements, and
that more traditional financing would be available before balloon
payments were due.

Traditional financing was not made available at a

later date, and many homeowners found themselves in foreclosure
procedures (Commonwealth of MA v. Resource Financial Group, Inc.,
Resource Lending, Inc., Resource Services, Inc.)

The Worst Consequence, Foreclosure
By law, foreclosure notices must be printed in local newspapers.
Foreclosure notices are a source of information for other mortgage
company loan originators.

Unregulated Boston-based loan originators

commonly used such information to solicit the affected homeowners with
the promise of saving their homes with more financing.

Typically, those

subsequent loans were also short-term, balloon debts which allowed the
homeowner to pay off the original debt and prevent immediate
foreclosure, but at an increasing amount of debt.
properties were sold to pay the debt.

Eventually, many

Second or third mortgage

companies often foreclosed on properties (Marks 1992).
SUMMARY

Such practices have a destabilizing effect on both the affected
households and their neighborhoods.

Homeowners lose the equity built in

their homes, which can cause financial difficulties.
also forced to leave after the foreclosure.

The homeowner is

To maximize the income from

rental properties, maintenance is reduced resulting in

deterioration

that can spread throughout the neighborhood, further destabilizing the
community (Achtenberg and Marcuse 1986).

Most of the housing units in

Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan are multi-family dwellings.

Review of

the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds records indicate that many of the
foreclosed homes were purchased by absentee landlords.
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CHAPTER TWO
SELECTED NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS

NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS
The objective of this chapter is to describe the income and
minority population of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan.

This

information is useful in determining which households are likely to be
granted or denied credit.

Selected neighborhoods in Boston are

discussed, including the area name, planning district, median household
income levels for 1980 and 1987, and the percent of black population.
Data Sources

Sources of statistical information on neighborhood characteristics
include census data and statistics compiled by the Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA).

Geographic units of analysis include planning

districts, defined by the BRA; census tracts; and neighborhood
statistical areas (NSAs).

NSAs are used in this discussion.

Planning

districts are used only to identify the respective communities.
Neighborhoods, Median Incomes, and Populations

The following list includes information regarding the
neighborhoods most affected by the hardlenders:
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leigbborhood/
Planning District
Dudley, Brunswick ling/
Ro1bury
Ash1ont/So . Dorchester
Bowdoin I., tit . Bowdoin/
So. Dorchester
Cod1an Sq., ! We Can, E.
Cod1an Bl/So. Dor.
E.Lower Mills, Cedar Grove/
So. Dorchester
Fields Corner East/So.Dor.
Fields Corner West/So.Dor.
Meeting House Hill/So . Dor.
leponset, Port lorfolk/
So. Dorchester
St. Marks/So. Dorchester
W.We Can, W.Cod1an Bl.,
W.Lower Mills/
Matt apan
Franklin Field lorth/
Roxbury
Franklin Field South/
Mattapan
Eggleston Sq./Roxbury
Southern Mattapan/Mattapan
Wellington Hill/Mattapan
Highland Part/Roxbury
Lower Roxbury/Roxbury
Savin-Moreland/Roxbury
Washington Park/Roxbury

1980
Median
Household
Income

1987
Median
Household
Income

$ 9,669
17,137

$16,649
28,621

67.1
6. 5

12,033
6,883

8,868

15,858

63.0

4,921

11, 360

19,420

77.0

9,884

14,303
ll, 238
14,336
11,795

34,211
24,394
24,730
24,037

.7

5,679

1.4
52.5
20.8

2, 111

5,881
6,803

16,368
14,429

32, 727
31,668

.7
8.1

8,317
8,644

14,621

31,936

59.4

5,951

10,112

17,048

94.4

6,859

9,608
9,690
16 , 183
12,849
8,965
6,401
10,625
9,582

15,290
18,200
22,073
23,932
17,623
45,352
19,187
20,087

90.5
31.0
76.1
91.8
76.0
84.7
85.0
91.1

10,362
6,505
12,008
7,506
3,252
4,494
6,099
18,550

1980
Percent
Population
1980
Black
Population

The median household income throughout the city of Boston in 1987
was $32,980 (Apgar 1991).

The statistics indicate that many of the

households of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan are below the median
household income for the city .

Most would not qualify for mortgages

under traditional lending guidelines.
The statistics suggest, however, that median incomes in a few
neighborhoods might be sufficient to qualify for mortgages or home
improvement loans under the traditional standard .

Of course, loan

approval should be based on individual income and total household debt.
11
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Still, it appears that some households would qualify for traditional
lending opportunities.

SUMMARY OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS
The objective of this chapter was to present selected neighborhood
characteristics of Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan, including median
household income levels and the percentage of minorities.

The data

suggest that many households would have difficulty in carrying debt, as
incomes are below the median income level.

There are several

neighborhoods, however, with residents earning enough income that some
would probably qualify for traditional financing opportunities.

CHAPTER THREE
LENDING PRACTICES OF
BOSTON'S MAJOR BANKS

BANKING PRACTICES:

REDLINING IN BOSTON

INTRODUCTION
Deregulation of the banking industry has bad broad effects across
the housing market, particularly in New England.

Speculative

investments in condominiums, commercial real estate, and much of the
single family housing stock in urban areas has weakened the solvency of
many financial institutions, resulting in less mortgage credit
availability throughout the industry.

The credit crunch that affects

the housing market for many low-income, minority New Englanders today,
however, is the continuation of a long-standing trend of disinvestment
in certain socio-economic neighborhoods.
This chapter examines the practice of redlining in Boston, and
addresses the first major question of the research:
lending practices of Boston's major banks?

what are the

The first section,

Redlining, defines redlining, and the predictable stages of neighborhood
transition.

The second section, Evidence of Redlining in Boston,

reviews some of the fundamental causes of bank lending restrictions in
inner-city neighborhoods (the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Study).
This is followed by a review of the effects of redlining on lower socioeconomic neighborhoods of Boston (the Finn Study).
Section One, Redlining
The Prevalence of Redlining Over Time
Redlining is defined as the failure of financial institutions to
provide loans in certain neighborhoods for buying and fixing houses
(Stone 1986).

While federal legislation, such as the 1977 Community
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Reinvestment Act, has attempted to discourage this practice, it
continues as it has for some time.
During the 1950s, FHA and VA guidelines served to constrict the
consideration of applications for mortgage financing from integrated or
minority areas.

This practice had the effect of redlining large areas

of urban development (Citizens Commission of Civil Rights 1986).

While

these institutions have changed their policies, similar effects result
from other practices throughout the industry.

The Federal National

Mortgage Association (FNMA), the Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA), and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(Freddie Mac) have established strict underwriting standards based on
suburban single family development, which continues to leave inner-city
neighborhoods at a mortgage credit disadvantage (Ferguson 1991).
In 1971, the National Urban League conducted a study of housing
decay and abandonment in seven major cities throughout the United
States.

The study concludes that redlining was prevalent in urban areas

throughout the country at that time (Listokin 1980).
More recently, two studies have been conducted in Boston to assess
lending opportunities in minority neighborhoods.

Both studies have

determined that redlining, despite the housing boom of the 1980s, is
still a common occurrence (Bradbury 1989) (Finn 1989).
The Transition of Neighborhoods
Neoclassical economic theory suggests that housing filters down.
Consumer choice is the motivating factor behind the deterioration of
neighborhoods.

The theory sees the change as a series of inevitable,

"natural" events.

It assumes that individual choices to move trigger
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decline and abandonment, and that banks react to, rather than encourage
the neighborhood change process.

Investors purchase housing after

families move out, and reduce maintenance on the building to enhance
profits.

The next phase in the process is redlining by financial

institutions (Meyerson 1986a).
This theory is founded on demand-side, rather than supply-side
economics.

It fails to acknowledge the role of banking policies,

particularly in inner-city neighborhoods, that influence household
preferences (Meyerson 1986a).
The Urban League research revealed a predictable pattern of stages
in the deterioration of urban neighborhoods.

The first evidence of

change in a neighborhood, according to the study, is a difference in
socio-economic status.

The second stage is a change in the racial

character of the neighborhood, with whites leaving and blacks entering.
The third stage shows evidence of property speculation and exploitation,
followed by deterioration of market conditions and disinvestment by both
the financial institutions and the property owners who stop maintaining
the property.

The final stage in the process is abandonment (Listokin

1980).

Fundamental Causes of Housing Deterioration
The primary cause of housing problems in the United States is that
housing is motivated by profit.

Inner-city absentee landlords invest

the least amount of maintenance costs to maximize profits on the
investment.
deteriorate.

This practice ensures that housing conditions will
Homeowners within the same neighborhood are affected by

the practice as well.

Mortgage lending institutions are likely to
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consider these neighborhoods "high-risk" and restrict credit to the
area.

Although poverty is a factor that must be analyzed in lending

practices, the area-wide credit restrictions serve to prohibit access to
mortgage funds for those households with the ability to repay their
debts (Achtenberg and Marcuse 1986).
That housing is not considered a right is reflected in the lack of
a comprehensive federal policy to ensure a safe shelter .

Federal

policies and programs have been compromised to special interests,
resulting in a series of schemes that, for lack of permanent investment,
have been almost guaranteed to fail (Achtenberg and Marcuse 1986).
Deregulation of the banking industry has the effect of
consolidating banking activities into huge, multinational financial
institutions.

Big bank mergers result in the need to cut expenses,

often achieved by closing down branches.

This practice causes

inconvenience to individuals in the affected neighborhoods and can
reduce available funds for mortgage lending (Meyerson 1986b).
Additionally, decisions to offer construction and mortgage loans
are often made on real or perceived expectations of risk.

Accordingly,

banks create a self-fulfilling prophecy when they restrict credit in a
particular neighborhood.

Even during periods of economic activity,

these areas deteriorate (Finn 1989).
Boston's inner-city neighborhoods, particularly Roxbury,
Dorchester and Mattapan, have felt the effects of redlining.
due, in part, to the economic boom of the 1980s.

This is

Some areas of the city

were selected for redevelopment and gentrification, such as the South
End, Bay Village and Chinatown.

Many households that were dislocated in
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this process have moved to Dorchester and Roxbury because the rent costs
were relatively less expensive.

An increase in the Asian population in

Roxbury from 1.9 percent in 1980 to 3.8 percent 1990 is evidence of this
change (U.S.Census of the Population, 1980 and 1990).
Gentrification was actively promoted by the actions of city
government.

It channelled federal funds into upscale areas, offered tax

breaks and/or public land to developers, and restricted the activities
of community development corporations to less desirable areas (McAfee
1986).

Although gentrification did not occur in all neighborhoods, it

had the effect of increasing housing costs, including rent, throughout
the city.

One effect of gentrification was the increase in condominium

conversions.

Over 20,000 rental units throughout the city were

converted, reducing the supply of rental units and increasing the cost
of the remaining rental units.

By 1988, Boston had become the fourth

least affordable housing market in the country (Finn 1989).
The recent downturn of the economy forced the city to cut back on
many social services, including schools, health centers, and bus routes
(McAfee 1986).

Economic forces have an effect on private enterprise as

well, particularly in the banking industry.

The effects of the

recession of the early 1990s is most evident in the minority
neighborhoods of the city.
Section Two, Evidence of Redlining in Boston

An underlying assumption in this research is that if traditional
mortgage and home improvement funds are available to minorities, the
need to seek alternative financing is unnecessary.

Therefore, an

investigation of traditional sources of financing is appropriate.

The Federal Reserve Bank and The Boston Redevelopment Authority Studies
A thorough examination of traditional lending opportunities
offered by banks throughout the city of Boston was completed in two
studies released in 1989.

The first was produced by the Federal Reserve

Bank of Boston, and written by Katharine Bradbury and others.

The

second was conducted by Charles Finn and commissioned by the Boston
Redevelopment Authority.
Both studies utilized Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) reports.
Neighborhood statistical areas (NSAs) defined by the Census Bureau and
the Boston Redevelopment Authority were used to examine banking
activities at a neighborhood level.

Both studies used Home Mortgage

Disclosure Act (HMDA) reports as a source of primary data, in addition
to data on mortgages maintained by the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds
and published by Banker & Tradesman, a weekly publication offering
specific information on real estate and banking matters.

In addition,

the Finn study used Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA) data on
loans applied to the area NSAs (Bradbury 1989) (Finn 1989).
Bank lending practices in the city are summarized in Table 3.1
(page 20).

Banks are ranked according to levels of banking activity

from the largest banks (with more than one billion dollars in deposits),
to the smaller banks (those with deposits of less than one billion
dollars.)

Clearly, the majority of banks in the city are not investing

in the minority neighborhoods, as indicated by the white/minority
lending ratios.
Some of the institutions listed in the table have gone out of
business since 1989.

These include First American Bank and Eliot
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Table 3.1

MORTGAGE LENDING BY BOSTON'S BANKS, 1981-1987

laat
First lat'l Bant of Boston
Bant of lew England
State Street 8ant
Sbawaut Bant
Boston Five
The Provident
RoaeOwners
U.S. Trust Coapany
South Boston Savings
leWorld Bant for Savings
first llutual of Boston
Baybant of Boston,
Harvard Trust and
lorfolt
first Aaerican Bant
Capitol Bank and Trust
Rayaartet Cooperative
Boston Trade Bant
Eliot Savings Bant
East Boston Savings Bant
Olyapic International
Wortingaen's Cooperative

VUte/lilorit7
leig•hrhod
latio
2.1:1
1.9: 1

Loaas
2.1:1
2.6:1

t

t

2. 3: 1
0.9:1
4.2:1
ILKI
1.6: 1
7.4:1
1.9 :1
2.5:1

12.0:1
0.9:1
8.0:1
ILKI
1. 8: 1
7.6:1
2. 0: 1
2.4:1

11.7:1
0.6:1
10.2:1
ILlll

11.7:1
0.7:1
10. 2: 1
ILKI

t

t

1.5: 1
43.3:1

2.0:1
42.8:1

t

t

3.6:1

3.5:1

2.9:1

3.4:1

Overall ratio (all banks)
t

htio hcldhg

'°''t 'uraated

Total leposit&
(Milliou,
l-1illions)
$7.4828
$6.0298
$3.9838
$3.131B
$1.4668
$1.1468
$1.1068
$888.89111
$766.18511
$764.81611
$563.69611
$433. 23011
$355.45111
$328.71811
$325.60611
$246.61111
$228.32011
$217.65111
$179.48011
$176.21111

lade too few tortg1ges to calc1late a r1tio

RD: lo 10rtgage lom ii 1horit7 aeigHorhoh

So1rces: lecisioa lese1rc• Scieaces, lac.

Savings Bank.

11i

lome lortgage Disclos1re .ltt, (Fi11 1989)

The Bank of New England has since been purchased by the

Fleet/Norstar Group.
The Federal Reserve Bank Study
The authors of the Federal Reserve Bank study assert that Roxbury,
Mattapan and parts of Dorchester are not receiving a fair share of
financing opportunities.

Various non-racial factors are included in the

analysis, including adjustments for less wealth, lower incomes, lowervalued housing, and less housing development.

Such adjustments reduce

the size of the discrepancy in lending by race, but there remains a 24
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percent difference in lending practices between neighborhoods with
predominately white populations and predominately black populations
(Bradbury 1989:4).
The authors of the Federal Reserve Bank study investigated the
financial sources for real estate transactions by type of lender between
1982 and 1987.

The sources of data included the file of individual deed

transfers maintained by the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds.

Because

this file contained commercial and industrial transactions as well as
residential sales, an adjustment was completed to more accurately
reflect residential sales activities throughout the city.

The findings

of the city-wide analysis indicate that nearly 60 percent of all
transactions in Boston during this period were financed by banks,
thrifts and their affiliated unregulated mortgage companies.

An

additional 15 percent were financed by unregulated mortgage companies
not affiliated with commercial banks or thrifts.

Other private lenders,

including credit unions, sellers, real estate trusts, pension funds and
others, accounted for 6.5 percent.

19 percent of the transactions were

shown to have no mortgage financing (Bradbury 1989:5-10).
Further analysis of real estate transactions and mortgages were
completed for the years 1982 through 1987 to examine the racial
integration of the neighborhoods.

Neighborhoods were categorized on the

basis of racial composition, ranging from those with nearly all white
populations to neighborhoods whose populations were largely black. The
neighborhood boundaries are those defined by NSA criteria, and included
populations which were composed of, roughly:
a)

less than 5 percent black residents,
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b)

between 5 and 20 percent black residents,

c)

between 20 and 50 percent black residents,

d)

50 and 80 percent black residents,

e)

more than 80 percent black residents.

For purposes of the Federal Reserve Bank study, Asians and other
minority groups were included as white.
The results of the analysis indicate a very different pattern of
lending in neighborhoods with a majority white population as compared to
neighborhoods with a majority black population.

In neighborhoods with a

majority white population, about 8.6 percent annually of all properties
were sold between 1982 and 1987, with an annual average of 6.9 percent
of the properties accepted for traditional mortgage financing.

In the

neighborhoods with a majority black population, 5.2 percent of the
properties sold, with 3.5 percent receiving bank financing (Bradbury
1989:12-13).
In neighborhoods less integrated, the differences are even
greater .

Bradbury reports:

"In neighborhoods with populations that were less than 5 percent
black, mortgages were originated on an average of 6.8 percent of
structures in an average year. In neighborhoods with populations
that were more than 80 percent black, mortgages were originated on
only 2.7 percent of structures in an average year" (Bradbury
1989:13).
The number of transactions is dependent on both the supply of and
demand for housing.

New construction and the number of condominium

conversions affect the supply, and periods of increased activity, such
as the 1980s, can create increased mortgage lending activity in one area
over another.

Housing demand is affected by household earnings, age,
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family size and composition, and other factors.

The study controlled

for these variables, as well as the fact that the majority of the
population in Boston was white and that whites might have been reluctant
to move into black areas.
buyers in black areas.

This served to reduce the pool of potential

It was determined that white householders were

more mobile than their black counterparts, and that blacks had less
opportunities for the sale or purchase of homes (Bradbury 1989:16).
Other variables used in the study to explain the difference in
lending, by race, include the percent of black residents, the percent of
other minorities, income, wealth, median value of single-family owneroccupied housing, rent, vacancy rate, commercial and industrial
property, mobility, age, housing development, depository institution
offices and economic conditions over time.

Raw data utilized before the

regression analysis indicates that there was a 60 percent difference in
the number of transactions in neighborhoods with black and white
populations.

This figure is adjusted to allow for the variables.

Nonetheless, neighborhoods with largely black populations receive 24
percent fewer mortgage transactions than neighborhoods composed of
mostly white residents after adjustment (Bradbury 1986:18-21).
Transactions with no recorded mortgages were also examined.

This

type of housing transaction accounts for approximately one-fifth of the
sales between 1982 and 1987.

There is a noticeable variation of

percentages of transactions with no recorded mortgages across the
neighborhoods.

While these transactions accounted for less than 20

percent of the total sales in neighborhoods with a majority of white
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residents, over 40 percent of the structures sold in neighborhoods with
more than 50 percent black residents were unfinanced (Bradbury 1989:21).
According to the Bradbury study, it is clear that banks and
thrifts are not lending unilaterally throughout Boston's neighborhoods.
Race has been determined to be a principal factor in determining the
desirability of lending in the area.
The Finn Study

The Finn study was published subsequent to the Federal Reserve
Bank report.

Finn used a different approach in his research.

Rather

than stressing neighborhood characteristics as causes of lending trends,
Finn interpreted these variables as influenced by lending practices.
The focus of this section, then, is on the demand for mortgage financing
as an explanation for bank lending practices (Finn 1989:4).
I

Finn concluded that the economic boom of the 1980s has put the
rate of homeownership for blacks well below the rate for whites.

In

fact, homeownership opportunities for blacks in Boston ranked last of 48
metropolitan areas in 1980.

The rate of homeownership for black

Bostonians was 41.3 percent, while the average of the 48 metropolitan
areas was 66.5 percent (Finn 1989:7). Additionally, the ratio of
mortgage loans per 1,000 units was 2.9 in neighborhoods with a majority
white population to 1 in neighborhoods with a majority black population
between 1981 and 1987 (Finn 1989:ii).
The Community Reinvestment Act requires banks to provide mortgage
funds to all neighborhoods, while maintaining sound banking practices.
The ability to repay debt is, of course, dependent on income.
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Therefore, it might be assumed that variations in lending practices
would be based on income.

However, this is not the case.

Finn categorized neighborhoods and census tracts into groups of
income "deciles", a category which reflects income based on 10 percent
of the census tract or neighborhoods.

Three income categories were

utilized:
"(1) the first through third deciles (median family incomes below
$28,805 in 1987); (2) the fourth through sixth deciles (median
family incomes between $28,805 and $46,455; and (3) the seventh
through tenth deciles (median family incomes above $46,455)" (Finn
1989:15).
Application of these categories to mortgage loans made per 1,000
units revealed that the lowest income category received 67 loans, while
the middle income category received 53 loans, and the highest income
category received 85 loans per 1,000 units (Finn 1989:15).
Finn determined a significant difference, however, in the levels
of financing between neighborhoods of the same income but with different
racial characteristics.

The Dudley, Brunswick King section of Roxbury,

for example, a neighborhood with a 67.1 percent black population,
received 17 loans per 1,000 units, while the West Fens neighborhood, an
area with an 8.4 percent black population, received 192 loans per 1,000
units (Finn 1989:15).

In the planning districts (a larger unit of

measure than neighborhoods) of Roxbury and Mattapan, only 33 and 35
mortgage loans per 1,000 units were found.

Similar planning districts

with a majority white population showed a range of loans, from 47 to 148
(Finn 1989:21).
The Finn study includes analysis of home improvement lending not
analyzed by the Federal Reserve Bank research.

The pattern Finn
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described for home improvement lending is opposite that of mortgage
lending, "banks actually provided more home improvement loans per 1,000
units in Boston's minority census tracts than they did in white census
tracts with comparable incomes" (Finn 1989:27).

The ratio of home

improvement loans to black residents, by census tract, was .55:1, a
trend that held in all income deciles.

This may be interpreted as

acknowledgement by banks of creditworthy individuals living in minority
neighborhoods.

The type of loan, of course, is different.

Home

improvement loans are typically higher-interest, shorter-term debts than
mortgage loans.

The increased activity may reflect the increasing value

of these homes, and the suitability of the structures for future sale
and mortgage financing (Finn 1989:27-29).
The Effects of Redlining
While there are many personal stories of hardship as a result of
redlining, the effects spread throughout the entire community.
Neighborhoods begin to deteriorate without a steady flow of funds, and
during periods of economic growth, disinvested neighborhoods suffer in
even greater proportions (Finn 1989).
Regulated lenders have put considerable investments into
condominiums, especially in lower - income neighborhoods with largely
majority white populations.

The effect of this practice is to reduce

the supply of affordable rental units.
economic development of the area.

This, in turn, can affect the

Many of the job opportunities

expected to increase in the near future are service-oriented jobs.
Traditionally, this type of employment pays less than manufacturing
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jobs.

High rent costs can reduce the available labor pool, and stifle

economic growth over the long run (Finn 1989).
SUMMARY

The objective of this chapter was to answer the question, what are
the lending practices of Boston's major banks?

Studies completed by the

Federal Reserve Bank of Bosto n and Charles Finn provide evidence that
redlining, especially for home mortgages, has occurred in minority
neighborhoods throughout the city.

Even with income adjustment s , the

city-wide ratio of lending in white and black borrowers is 2.9:1.

In

other words, white borrowers are nearly three times as likely to receive
loans than are black borrowers.

Some neighborhoods have experienced a

ratio higher than the city average.
Although home mortgages are not readily available in minority
areas, home improvement loans by banks show the reverse trend.

The high

level of activity in minority neighborhoods by unregulated mortgage
companies for home improvements may be a result of real or perceived
discrimination by banks.
It is evident that Boston's banks are not meeting their Community
Reinvestment Act (CRA) requirements .

The CRA requires that regulated

banks develop products that meet the needs of the community they serve,
including low- and moderate-income areas.

Banks have a positive

obligation to market and advertise "programs for lending products and
services that are responsive to the needs of the community and that will
inform and stimulate awareness of those products and services throughout
the community, including low- and moderate-income areas" (Federal
Reserve Board, Comptroller of the Currency, et al, 1989:6).

Such a
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statement can be interpreted as awareness of the impact of a negative
perception.
The following section of this report, Chapter Four, will examine
the lending practices of mortgage companies throughout the city.

For

minority neighborhoods, this resource appears to be a major opportunity
for financing not afforded by banks.

CHAPTER FOUR
ALTERNATIVE FINANCING OPPORTUNITIES:
MORTGAGE COMPANIES

MORTGAGE COMPANY PRACTICES IN BOSTON
The preceding chapter reviewed redlining in Boston and the extent
of mortgage lending by regulated banks in neighborhoods with a majority
white population and those with minority populations.
Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan have been redlined.

It is clear that
Even though banks

offer home improvement loans at a higher ratio to black neighborhood
residents over white neighborhood residents, it is likely that black
residents perceive that they have little or no access to traditional
sources of financing.
The failure of Boston's banks to make loans in minority
neighborhoods creates a demand for financing that is being met by nontraditional institutions, including mortgage companies.

Mortgage

companies are defined in this context as those lending companies which
are not regulated by the Federal Reserve Board, Comptroller of the
Currency, and other government regulatory agencies.

The mortgage

companies that are analyzed in this project are those that provide loans
to borrowers through a line of credit established by the mortgage
companies from regulated banks.
This chapter describes the lending patterns of mortgage companies
operating in the city of Boston.

The second and third major questions

presented for analysis are addressed:

What finance structure enables

unregulated mortgage companies to operate? and, Who are the unregulated
lenders in violation of established lending standards and in what
neighborhoods do they operate?
Mortgage companies, until recently, operated in an unregulated
environment in Massachusetts.

Although they offer loans in a manner
30
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similar to banks, albeit at generally higher interest rates, they do not
collect deposits to replenish their funds as banks do.

A discussion of

the relationship of mortgage companies with banks to replenish mortgage
funds will be offered.

This discussion is followed by the analysis of

mortgage company lending patterns in Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan.
The Role of Mortgage Companies Within the Mortgage Finance System
Deregulation of the banking industry has served to promote
fundamental changes with regard to mortgage financing.

The supply of

mortgage funds is no longer strictly within the domain of savings and
loans, as had been the case under the constraints of New Deal
legislation before banking deregulation (Florida 1986) (Olson 1990).
Other types of regulated banks, such as commercial banks, national
banks, or state chartered banks, have attempted to increase their share
of mortgage loans.

One method of increasing the share of mortgage

financing is through mortgage banking firms (Olson 1990).
Mortgage companies often operate in an unregulated market
unrestricted by federal or state mandates such as CRA or Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) guidelines.

Nor do government safeguards apply to

mortgage companies, such as the QTL requirement (Regulation Q) that 70
percent of savings and loans assets be invested in residential mortgages
(Olson 1990).
Mortgage companies put their energies into marketing their
products.

Because they are non-depository institutions, all the loans

they originate must be sold either to a bank or, if the mortgage
companies are large enough, directly into the secondary mortgage market.
Very few mortgage companies, however, are large enough to remain
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independent of banks.

Kost operate under a line of credit extended by

banks (Rose and Hanley 1990).
This relationship works well for major banks.

One result of

deregulation has been the consolidation of banks, with the larger
institutions purchasing their smaller competitors.

Such purchases, of

course, draw on the larger banks' resources, so to strengthen their
reserves, the banks will attempt to reduce their costs of doing
business.

One successful method is to have mortgage brokers originate

and service loans.

Banks purchase the loans from the mortgage companies

and, in turn, sell those mortgages that meet the criteria of the
secondary mortgage market (Olson 1990).
This method eliminates the need for banks to hire personnel to
originate and service loans, and also relieves them of constraints
imposed be federal or state mandates, such as upper limits on interest
charges, or regulatory disclosure requirements.

The practice also

relieves the banks of any responsibility for loans that might be
questionable in terms of interest rates or closing costs and insulates
them from public criticism when irregular lending practices are exposed
(Canellos 1991).
Of the top 300 mortgage companies in the United States, most are
owned by banks.

In fact, of the top 100 mortgage companies, only nine

are independent (American Banker 1989).

The top ten independent

mortgage companies are listed in Table 4.1 (page 34).

The ranking is

determined by servicing portfolios as of 1988.
The mortgage company that ranked number one, Lomas and Nettleton,
incidently, has filed for bankruptcy (Olson 1990).

This might suggest

that the long-term success
Table 4 .1
of mortgage companies will

TOP TEN INDEPENDENT MORTGAGE
COMPANIES, 1988

be determined by their
relationship with the
banking industry (Olson
1990).
Wholesale mortgage
bank activity has been
increasing in recent years.
The opportunity to assume
the role held by savings and

Rank Along All
!lorhage Couanies

Fir1
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Lo1as Financial Corp.
I1co Realty Service
Waterfield !lortgage
Donan & Wilson
lational !lortgage Co.
Tork Associates
Co11onvealtb !lortgage
Colonial Mortgage
Guild Mortgage
Loan Alerican

4

26
31
53
63
73
80
89
96
98

Some: htricn laabr (1989) 1 fro1 D..l. Oboa's article h
Jnraal of lmhg lmmk (1990)

loan institutions before
banking regulation has proven to be profitable.

In periods of decline,

the wholesale banks can simply reduce the number of mortgage purchases
from brokers rather than reduce personnel or close branch offices.

The

top 58 largest wholesale mortgage banks volume purchases nationally rose
from $28.5 billion in 1988 to $50.9 billion in 1989, and was expected to
reach $60 billion in 1990 (Olson 1990).
Banks that have extended lines of credit to mortgage companies
operating in Boston are listed in Table 4.2 (page 35).

Of the

affiliated banks listed in the local list, Fleet Mortgage/Real Estate
Funding was ranked number one in the nation's top ten wholesale mortgage
banks in 1990, with planned purchases of $7,300,000,000 (Olson 1990).
This evidence suggests that recent activity in mortgage lending is
for larger banks to establish wholesale mortgage banks to do business
with mortgage brokers (Olson 1990).
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Table 4.2

LOCAL MORTGAGE COMPANIES AND THEIR BANK
AFFILIATES, 1990

Kortgage Co1panies

Bank Affiliates

Chrysler First
Ci ti corp
First Co11onvealth Financial Rockland Trust Co.
Leader Kortgage
Bank Five for Savings
Koney Store
lev Jersey Bank IA
Horizon Bank IA
!1erican lat'l Bank
lew England Financial
Saugus Bank &Trust Co.
Consultants
Lynn Five &Colonial Bank
First Colonial Bank for Savings
lortheastern Kortgage
First lat'l Bank of
Louisville
First Colonial Bank of
Louisville
First lat'l Bank of Boston
Banc Boston Leasing Inc.
Bank Five for Savings
Resource Equity
Lincoln Trust Co.
Resource Financial Corp.
Fleet lat 'l Bank
Resource Lending of l.B.
Fleet lat'l Bank
Resource lortheast Inc.
Fleet lat 'l Bank
Worcester County Inst. for
Sterling Kortgage Co.
Savings
Baybank Kiddlesex
Bank of lev England (nov
Fleet) Worcester County
Sun Financial Group Inc.
laples Federal S &L Assoc.
The Resource Group Inc.
Fleet lat' l Bank
Source:

Unifor1 Co11ercial Code, 1991

Hortgage Company Lending Practices in Boston

This section of the chapter on lending reviews the loan patterns
of unregulated mortgage companies in Boston, Massachusetts.

The general

pattern of such activities is provided by unpublished research compiled
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.

The general nature of this

analysis, however, fails to completely assess the impact of unregulated
mortgage company practices in minority neighborhoods.
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Therefore, for
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purposes of this study, these data were supplemented by unpublished data
compiled by Union Neighborhood Assistance Corporation and were analyzed
by this author.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK STUDY OF HORTGAGE COHPANY LENDING PRACTICES

Data Sources and Kethodology
In response to the media coverage of the so-called second mortgage
scam, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston conducted research to document
the total number of high-rate loans secured by real estate in Suffolk
County (95 percent of which is Boston).

The focus of their research was

on non-acquisition loans, meaning that no deed was transferred.

These

included second mortgage loans, first mortgages, and refinancing first
mortgages (Munnell and Browne 1991).
The initial examination of mortgage company lending patterns
presented in this chapter is based on the Federal Reserve study.

The

Federal Reserve research analyzed the number of high-rate loans
originated by mortgage companies in Boston and compared that to the
number of loans originated in Roxbury and Mattapan from 1987 to 1990.
Data collection by the Federal Reserve researchers began with a
review of Banker and Tradesman, a Boston publication that provides the
name of the borrower, the property address, the lender and the amount of
the loan.

Terms of maturity and some interest rate information, not

available from this source, were available at the Suffolk County
Registry of Deeds.
Initial research by the Federal Reserve revealed that 51,223 such
transactions had occurred between 1987 and 1990 (Munnell and Browne
1991).

To simplify the research task, some assumptions were made by the
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Federal Reserve researchers.

The local media had reported that the so-

called scam was particularly prevalent in minority areas, so the first
assumption made by the Federal Reserve researchers was that Roxbury and
Mattapan would be appropriate neighborhoods for their research.
Subsequently, the researchers' decision identified a number of mortgage
companies active in these areas.

A second assumption was made by the

Federal Reserve researchers that if mortgage companies are not making
high-risk loans in these areas, they are probably not making them
elsewhere.

Therefore, mortgage companies offering standard interest

rates were omitted from the search.

Thus, the research task became more

manageable.
The next stage in the analysis by the Federal Reserve researchers
was to define categories according to loan product terms and interest
rates (Munnell and Browne 1991).

Three such groups were defined:

1) Group 1 lenders offering typically short-term maturities (up
to five years) with high interest rates (18-percent or more).
These loans were defined as "very burdensome";
2) Group 2 lenders offering more manageable products with
maturities from five to twenty years and interest rates of 15- to
18-percent. The Federal Reserve researchers felt the Group 2
products offered flexibility and the opportunity to refinance if
necessary;
3) Group 3 lenders offering products that are long-term
(typically five to twenty years) with some moderately high
interest rates (15- to 18-percent), and some conventional interest
rates (under 15-percent).
4) Group 4 lenders offering conventional rates (under 15-percent)
and conventional terms (typically up to twenty years).
These groupings, as defined, are used in subsequent analyses of this
research project for purposes of clarity and continuity.
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The Federal Reserve researchers experienced difficulties, however,
in examining the interest rates offered by mortgage companies as the
Registry of Deeds records did not always include interest rates.
Therefore, with companies that provided enough information to assume a
pattern, such as Mortgage Funding Corporation, the Federal Reserve
researchers categorized lenders according to that interest-rate pattern.
Other companies, including Growth Mortgage Company and Chrysler First
Eastern Financial Corporation, did not provide enough information to
permit such assignments.

Consequently, Growth Mortgage transactions

were not included in the Federal Reserve analysis.

It was also assumed

by the Federal Reserve researchers that the companies were not high-rate
lenders if their products were long term.

This assumption applies to

Chrysler First Eastern Financial Corp.
Major Findings of the Federal Reserve Bank Study
The following figures represent the number of loans and their
geographic distribution.

These figures were tabulated by the Federal

Reserve researchers.
According to the Federal Reserve study, 698 loans were made
throughout the city between 1987 and 1990 at interest rates in excess of
18-percent, most of which matured in less than five years (Table 4.3).
An additional 1,630 loans were made with interest rates between 15- and

18-percent, but with longer maturity periods.

The remaining loans were

made with interest rates under 15-percent, or were unidentified (Munnell
and Browne 1991).
While the number of high-interest loans in Roxbury and Mattapan
total 207, this figure represents almost 30 percent of loans made

throughout
Table 4.3

SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE COMPANY LOANS BY RATE,
1987-1990

Suffolk County.
Additionally,
Dorchester has
not been
included in this
total, making it
impossible to
determine if

Total S1ffoll

lest of

lo1hr7/
Batton

S1ffolt Coutr

698
1,630
39,581

207
298
2,147

491
1,332
37,434

...Lill.

...LllQ.

.Lill.

4,022

47,201

htmst late

Cmh

18% or .ore
15% to 18%
Under 15%
Unidentified
Total

51,223

Source: Federal Reserve Bank lle•o to Diet Syron fro• Alicia
llunnell and Lynn Browne, Re: Second llortgages in Suffolk County:
1987-90, Dated August 14, 1991. Figures are esti•ates based on
data fro• Registry of Deeds and Banter &Trades•an.

these products
are specifically targeted to a geographic area or spread throughout the
city using the data from the Federal Reserve study.

Dorchester is

located between Roxbury and Mattapan in the south-central area of the
city.
The
Federal Reserve

Table 4.4 SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE LENDERS, ROXBURY/MATTAPAN
AND SUFFOLK COUNTY

Bank study also
categorized the

lo1hr7/
Total
lat ton
High Rates, Generally Short !er•

lest of
Stffolt

lenders

GROUP 1 LllDlRS:

according to

Total
762
179
583
GROUP 2 LEIDERS: lloderately High Rates, Generally Long Tera
Total
1,591
304
1,287

rates and terms.
Table 4. 4 offers
a summary of the

GROUP 3 L[JDERS: Con•entional Rates, So•e lloderately High Rates
Total
11 983
394
1,589

number of

GROUP 4 LEIDERS:
Total

transactions by

Source:

Conventional Rates
23,150
1,775

21,375

Federal Reserve Bant lle•o dated August 14, 1991

lender group.
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UNAC RESEARCH OF MORTGAGE COKPANY LENDING PRACTICES

Data Sources and Hethodology
The review of Federal Reserve Bank data are supplemented in this
project by unpublished data collected by Union Neighborhood Assistance
Corporation (UNAC).

UNAC researchers took a different approach than the

Federal Reserve researchers in identifying the high-rate lenders.
UNAC researchers compiled a list of mortgage companies that
offered products with high rates and short term maturities (Group 1
lenders by the Federal Reserve definition), or moderately high rates and
longer term maturities (Group 2 lenders by the same criteria).

UNAC

researchers were able to verify the interest rates through examination
of the actual loan agreements signed by victimized homeowners.
UNAC researchers brought the list of suspected mortgage companies
to the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds.

The Registry data base is

capable of sorting by mortgage or loan grantee, that is, the institution
or individual that holds a note on a property.

This search identified

all properties in Suffolk County that had a mortgage originated by the
listed mortgage companies.
UNAC researchers then conducted a search of each property address
in the Registry records to review all legal claims held on that
property.

Worksheets were completed on each owner-occupied property

(investment properties were not included), recording each entry made by
the Registry Clerk advising on the status of the property from 1985 to
1990, including the street address of the property, the neighborhood
(Roxbury, Dorchester, Jamaica Plain, etc.), the owner's name, the date
of the mortgage, the name of the mortgage company, code of the
39
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transaction, including actions taken by the mortgage company or the city
such as a tax taking, and the book and page number.

Unfortunately, the

Suffolk County Registry of Deeds records do not contain information on
individual loan-to-value ratios, an important measure to determine an
individual's ability to carry debt.

The financial difficulties

experienced by a household are revealed, in part, by the claims against
the property.
This method produced detailed information on over 660 properties
throughout Suffolk County .

Data from the worksheets were useful in

supplementing the Federal Reserve Bank data to create a more detailed
account of mortgage company transactions, particularly the high-rate
lenders.
UNAC and other community development organizations distributed a
survey to the victimized homeowners in the spring of 1992.

This action

came in response to the state's Attorney General's request that UNAC
provide details of the loan agreements made by hardlenders.

Thirty-four

surveys were made available to this author as a sample of the victimized
homeowners.

Information on contractors was included in the surveys, as

well as income and household debt.
ANALYSIS OF HORTGAGE COHPANY LENDING PATTERNS BY THIS AUTHOR

Kethodology and Data Sources

The UNAC worksheets were made available to this author by Bruce
Marks, UNAC Executive Director.

Because the worksheets listed the

claims against the properties contained little analysis, the data could
be reviewed without preconceived opinions regarding the status of the
properties.

This author first sorted the property addresses by
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neighborhood.

Each property was then categorized through the use of

indicators to reflect the approximate risk to the property owner.
Indicators included foreclosure notices, evidence of possession, and
attachments or liens on property.
indicators are presented below.

A complete list of the groupings and
This manner of organizing the data

facilitated examination of the consequences to homeowners who contracted
with high rate mortgage companies.

The groups included:

Group A: the original owner still owned the home, and there were
no indicators of financial difficulties, such as an attachment or
levy (lien) or tax lien against the property.
Group B: the original owner still owned the home, but indicators
of financial difficulties were evident. Indicators included
attachment, levy (lien), tax lien, evidence of possession, order
notice pf foreclosed mortgage, or notice petition of foreclosed
tax .
Group C: the property had changed hands either by foreclosure or
by deed, following an order notice of foreclosed mortgage or a
notice petition of foreclosed tax.
Group D:

the property had changed hands through sale by owner.

The worksheets were also used to analyze the number of loans
attached to each property .

This was achieved by simply counting the

mortgage companies and other lenders recorded for each property by the
Registry of Deeds .
This author experienced the same difficulty in determining the
interest rates as the Federal Reserve researchers, as disclosure
information was not required and little information was available from
Registry records.

The Registry of Deeds data on interest rates are

supplemented by a review of court cases.

Further Analysis of Mortgage Company Lending Patterns
The Dorchester information was obtained from the UNAC worksheets.
Two Group 1 mortgage companies (i.e. short maturities, high interest
rates) have been particularly active in Roxbury, Dorchester and
Mattapan.

The companies are the Resource Companies (including all loans

originated under the owner's various names) and Growth Mortgage.

It is

interesting to note that the Federal Reserve study did not include
information on Growth Mortgage in any of its lender categories.
Information that was available on this company from interviews by UNAC
with affected homeowners indicated that the loans were balloon payment
debts.

Registry of Deeds records demonstrate that foreclosure notices

were issued on many properties approximately one year after contracting
the loan.

Growth Mortgage was included in the Group 1 category of

lenders as it appears to meet the defined criteria.
The Resource Companies contracted a total of 336 loans in
Dorchester, Roxbury and Mattapan.

This figure is higher than the

Federal Reserve Bank total of 232 because the Federal Reserve study
covered the period from 1987 to 1990, while the UNAC research began in
1985 and continued through 1990.

Of the total 336 loans, Resource made

192, or 57.1 percent of its loans in Dorchester, 38, or 11.3 percent in
Roxbury, and 61, or 18.2 percent in Mattapan.

Combined, this indicates

that 86.6 percent of their lending activity throughout all of Suffolk
County is distributed in the three neighborhoods analyzed in this
research project.
Growth Mortgage followed the lending pattern of the Resource
Companies.

A total of 98 loans were made throughout Suffolk County,
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with 59, or 60.2 percent in Dorchester, 14, or 14.3 percent in Roxbury,
and 9, or 9.2 percent in Mattapan.

These figures suggest that

Dorchester has experienced a higher proportion of Group 1 lender
products than all other neighborhoods combined.
For comparison, the authors of the Federal Reserve study tabulated
the total number of loans made at less than 15-percent interest rates in
Roxbury and Mattapan at 2,147, which represents 5.4 percent of the total
throughout the city.

The citywide average of all loans with traditional

interest rates issued by mortgage companies represents over 77 percent.
These figures suggest there is a real disparity in the lending practices
of mortgage companies in different neighborhoods throughout the city.

Number of Loans per Property
The preceding figures have focused on the loan types and their
neighborhood distribution.

The following analysis concentrates on the

properties and the number of loans attached to each.

These data are

compiled from the worksheets collected at UNAC.
The sample size for analysis is 269 properties contracted with
Group 1 lenders.
total is 762.

The Federal Reserve study states the Suffolk County

The sample size is believed to be large enough to offer

an accurate representation of Group 1 lender patterns.
Typical banking industry standards provide that no more than two
loans be attached to a property (Couture 1992).

Generally, these would

include the first mortgage and a second "equity" loan, a product that
became popular during the 1980s.

Equity loans have replaced fixed-rate

home improvement loans, in that the interest rates generally vary,
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usually one or two interest points over the prime interest rate.

Banks

adjust interest rates accordingly, reducing their risk (Couture 1992).
Analysis of
the sample
properties leads to
the conclusion that
the majority of

Table 4.5

NUMBER OF MORTGAGES ON PROPERTIES

Dorchester
Roxbury
!attapan
lu•ber of Loans Attached to Properties
1-2 3+
1-2 3+
1-2 3+

1-2 3+

62

21

88

14 17

17

32

Others

18

Soiree: Property retoris, Saffoll Co11ty Registry of Deeds

properties in
Dorchester, Roxbury and Mattapan had over three loans attached to them
(Table 4.5).
analysis.

Dorchester data alone produced 150 properties for

Of these, 62 properties had one or two loans, and 88 had

three or more, many of which had five or six loans, and two properties
had eleven loans attached.

Of the total properties throughout the

county under contract with Group 1 lenders, 42.4 percent of the sample
satisfied banking standards, with one or two mortgages, while 57.6
percent exceeded (i.e. did not meet) the two-loan maximum industry
standard.

Interest Rates
Determining the interest rates contracted
was difficult.

~th

the Group 1 lenders

This industry had not been regulated, and mortgage

companies were not required to make such information public.

The

property records of the Suffolk County Registry of Deeds offer some
interest rate information.

The

follo~ng

list, compiled through a

review of the court case, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Resource
Companies, offers an example of information that is available on the
Resource Companies:
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Property at 848 Huntington Ave., Boston. Amount financed:
$6,751, annual interest rate: 39.45-percent, finance charge:
$5,327.28, total payments due: $12,078.28
Properties at 14 and 16 Abbott St., Dorchester. Amount financed:
$30,800, annual interest rate: 34.09-percent, finance charge:
$21,000, total payments due: $51,800
Property at 9 Mt. Bowdoin Terrace, Dorchester. Amount financed:
$30,800, annual interest rate: 34.09-percent, finance charge:
$21,000, total payments due: $51,800
Property at 18 Mascot St., Dorchester. Amount financed: $10,750,
annual interest rate: 33.68-percent, finance charge: $7,242.68,
total payments due: $17,992.68
Property at 22 Rutland St., Boston. Amount financed:
annual interest rate: 30.86-percent, finance charge:
total payments due: $90,700.32

$56,082.16,
$34,618.32,

Property at 40 Oak St., Hyde Park. Amount financed: $6,830,
annual interest rate: 42.09-percent, finance charge: $5,750,
total payments due: $12,580
Property at 82 Rosewood St., Mattapan. Amount financed $18,100,
annual interest rate: 31 . 77-percent, finance charge: $11,500,
total payments due: $29,600
Rates above 24-percent interest are usurious by industry standards
(Couture 1992).

The courts, as well, have found the rates to be

exceptionally high.

A summary of the court charges will be offered in

the Chapter Five.
The burden these loans impose on homeowners can be seen in the
number of foreclosures that have occurred in Roxbury, Dorchester and
Mattapan.

Of 348 properties analyzed, 147, or 42.2 percent, were

classified as Group C, the homeowners lost their homes either by
foreclosure or deed.

Another 97, or 27.9 percent, were classified as

Group B, evidence of financial difficulties are evident and homeowners
are at risk of losing their properties.

Only 57 properties, or 16.4

percent show no evidence of losing their homes (Group A), and 47, or
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13.5 percent, have sold their homes (Group D).

These data indicate the

lending practices by mortgage companies have had a destabilizing effect
on both the residents and the neighborhoods.
Contractor Lending Practices

The media covering of the second mortgage scam reported that
contractors were often working with mortgage companies, and acted as
loan originators in obtaining borrowers' signatures on the loan
applications.

This scenario was also offered in the public presentation

by Diane Modica, Commissioner of Consumer Affairs and Licensing, City of
Boston, in Mattapan on June 24, 1991 that this author attended.

Very

little information on contractors was found in the search through the
Registry of Deeds records.
Review of Registry records indicated a total of nine liens
altogether were attached to properties in the 660 city-wide records
reviewed.

U.S. Window Corp. had four property liens, three of which

were on properties located in Dorchester and one in Jamaica Plain.
Vinyl Distributors of New England, Inc. had a lien against one property
in Dorchester, as did NewPro, Inc., New England Brickmaster, Inc.,
Boston Building and Remodeling, Inc., and Elan Window Corp.
Additional information on contractors was obtained from surveys
completed by the victimized homeowners.
were analyzed by this author.

A sample of thirty-four surveys

Eighteen surveys stated the second

mortgages were taken for home repairs, sixteen surveys stated the second
mortgages were taken for refinancing, debt consolidation, or such
personal concerns as college tuition payments.
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Survey responses indicated that half of the loans taken for home
improvements resulted in unsatisfactory construction.

Substandard

conditions included leaking roofs, unsafe stairs and/or porches, heaters
that were not working, and windows that were not air tight.

Three

respondents stated no improvements were completed, and the contractors
had been paid for the work.

The contractor companies against whom the

complaints were made include U.S. Window Corp., Seacoast Industries,
Inc., City Home Improvement, and Commonwealth Thermal Products.
Violations of Truth-In-Lending Requirements
The borrowers were questioned in the survey to determine if they
had completed the loan application, or if the application was completed
by the loan originator.

Survey questions asked if the borrowers were

informed of the conditions of the loan, including the interest rates,
the length of the loan, the amount of closing costs, prepayment
penalties, and the condition of balloon payments.

Twenty-three of the

thirty-four respondents answered these questions.

Of the twenty-three

respondents, twelve stated the loan applications were completed for
them, while eleven borrowers completed the applications themselves.
Only one respondent stated that the loan originator made a full
disclosure of the conditions of the loan.

In most cases, partial

information was offered by the loan originator.

The balloon payment at

the end of the term was the most common piece of information not
disclosed, followed by the amount of closing costs and pre-payment
penalties.

These data suggest that truth-in-lending laws are commonly

violated by the loan originators.

Household Income Information
Household income levels were also stated in the surveys.

Almost

all of the households that were shown in the samples earned
approximately $20,000 annually, suggesting that most were probably not
in a position to successfully carry the debt incurred by contracting
with the hardlenders.

Three households earned between $30,000 and

$40,000, and one household earned $75,000 annually.

It has not been

possible to confirm the individuals' credit history due to
confidentiality laws.
SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE COMPANY LENDING PRACTICES
The objective of this chapter was to answer the major questions,
What finance structure enables unregulated mortgage companies to
operate; and, Who are the unregulated lenders in violation of
established lending standards, and in what neighborhoods do they
operate?

Review of recent literature suggests that mortgage companies

operate through a line of credit extended by major banks.

Analysis of

Suffolk County Registry of Deeds records described the lending practices
of several mortgage companies offering very burdensome loan products in
Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan.

Information on the geographic

distribution of mortgage companies was offered, indicating that mortgage
companies operate in the specific neighborhoods redlined by banks.

The

number of loans, and the number of loans attached to properties were
offered, indicating that many households incurred more debts than the
banking industry standards suggest.

What information is available on

the terms and interest rates of the loans were offered as well, many of
which do not satisfy banking industry standards.
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Additional information was offered on some on the contractors that
have provided home improvements at various levels of completion and
satisfaction.

Little information is available on this group from the

data sources.

Perhaps this question should be the focus of another

research project using different data sources, such as the records of
the Better Business Bureau or records maintained by the Office of the
Commission of Licensing and Consumer Affairs.
Responses to a sample of surveys completed by victimized
homeowners suggest that violations of truth-in-lending laws was a common
practice of the loan originators of Boston-based mortgage companies.
This information, however, must be classified as anecdotal as the actual
contracts signed by the borrowers were, in most cases, not made
available.
Chapter Five will review the efforts of the city of Boston and
community groups to seek an equitable resolution to the unfair practices
that have occurred in the city's minority neighborhoods.

CHAPTER FIVE
EFFORTS TO REMEDY THE
"SECOND MORTGAGE SCAM"

THE CITY RESPONDS TO THE "SCAM"
Mortgage companies have met the demand for mortgage and home
improvement financing, but have done so through the use of products that
are unacceptable by banking industry standards.

Community groups and

activists brought the lending practices into the public awareness
through the media, and the city of Boston has responded by attempting to
seek an equitable resolution to the problem.
One of the first and most effective remedies was to regulate
mortgage companies in Massachusetts.

The new regulation is

Massachusetts General Law 255E that became effective on January 1, 1992.
Under the provisions of the new law, mortgage companies must maintain a
$100,000 net worth, while contractors are allowed to post a bond for
this amount.

Rate and term disclosure requirements are included,

administered by the Massachusetts Banking Commission.

Temporary

licenses have been given to existing mortgage companies while they are
investigated by the Banking Commission.

At the time of this writing,

thirty-three mortgage company licenses have been suspended for noncompliance with the regulation.
An incentive to the banking industry had been their ability to use

loans originated by mortgage companies in minority neighborhoods as
credit toward their CRA responsibilities.

H.6021, An Act to Further

Regulate Mortgage Lending, addressed this issue.

The state CRA, Section

14, Chapter 167, had allowed a bank that buys loans from a high interest
lender or that provides financing to such a lender to receive positive
CRA credit.

The new law, H.6021, reduces this credit, and also caps

interest rates.
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The Attorney General imposed a moratorium on foreclosures by
mortgage companies suspected of charging usurious interest rates.

A

reinvestment program is currently being developed to seek an equitable
remedy for those homeowners affected by mortgage company lending
practices.

It is proposed that mortgage company loans be reviewed to

determine the amount of the loan.

Standard interest rates would be

applied to that amount, the additional fees will be eliminated, and the
borrower would be responsible for only the amount borrowed at standard
rates.

The details of this program, of course, are not yet available,

as the Attorney General is currently collecting the data necessary to
conduct such an analysis .
Banks have come forward to provide needed funds to minority
communities as well.

Shawmut Bank has provided $5 million through the

Massachusetts Housing Partnership to provide relief for victims of
usurious interest rates and to create a pool for first-time buyers in
minority neighborhoods.

Baybank is expected to contribute several

million dollars, and Fleet, which had extended a line of credit to the
Resource Companies (the largest high rate lender in Roxbury, Mattapan
and particularly Dorchester), has provided some $65 million to the city
of Boston and a housing development program it administers.

An

additional $30 million has been provided by Fleet through its Bank of
New England (BNE) purchase and prior commitments of BNE .
Charges have been brought against the some of the hardlenders.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts brought charges against Home Repair,
Inc., formally Seacoast Industries, Inc., and Robert Finestone for
unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the sale of home improvement
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services and in the provision of mortgage and other loan services in
connection with financing home improvements services.

These acts are in

violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act., G.L. Chapter
93A, Section 2 (A).
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts also brought charges against
Resource Financial Group, Inc., Resource Lending, Inc., and Resource
Services, Inc., all of 175 Derby St., Hingham, MA.

The charges included

unfair and deceptive acts and practices in violation of the
Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, and charges that the companies
engaged in oppressive and unconscionable acts or practices.

Such acts

included charging full interest rates made to customers on funds held by
Resource as "security funds or deposits" without providing any use or
benefit to the customers for the use of these funds, and for charging
such interest on the security funds as to be oppressive and
unconscionable.

Additional charges were brought against Resource

Companies for violating truth-in-lending laws.

Hopefully, these court

cases will discourage mortgage companies from engaging in unfair lending
practices in the future.
Bank regulators have agreed to assert their authority and require
banks to meet their CRA responsibilities as well.

It is assumed that if

the demand for home financing is met by traditional sources, the need
for alternative financing will be reduced.

CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS

CONCLUSIONS
This author described the lending practices of banks and mortgage
companies in the selected Boston neighborhoods of Roxbury, Dorchester
and Mattapan.

Because city officials and community groups are currently

seeking remedies to solve the problems of usurious lending practices by
unregulated mortgage companies, this research project cannot address all
the issues involved with the lending structure in place in
Massachusetts.

Nonetheless, these findings provide a base-line of

information to assist other researchers in subsequent investigations.
The evidence presented in this report indicates that the regulated
banking industry has not met the needs of low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods in Boston as required by the CRA.

Even with adjustments

for wealth and income, it is evident that neighborhoods with a majority
of black residents have been redlined by the banking industry.

The

resulting credit crunch in Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan has created
a demand that was met by unregulated mortgage companies.
No attempt was made by this researcher to determine if mortgage
company products were marketed specifically to residents in the subject
neighborhoods.

However, it seems more than coincidence that the

usurious mortgage companies would market the highest proportion of their
products in precisely the same neighborhoods that the banks have
redlined.

'Whether by coincidence or design, the equity lending

practices of these mortgage companies were found to adversely affect
disproportionate numbers of poor black residents in Roxbury, Dorchester
and Mattapan.
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The author determined that subject mortgage companies operated
through financial relationships with banks.

Some, particularly the

Resource Companies funded by Fleet Bank, packaged loan products that
were very burdensome to borrowers.

A result of this practice was often

foreclosure.
This practice has a destabilizing effect, and promotes the
deterioration of the housing stock within neighborhoods.

The

predictable pattern of deterioration established by the Urban League
suggests that Roxbury, Dorchester and Mattapan are currently in the
third or fourth stage of housing transition.

That is, there is evidence

of property speculation and exploitation (Stage 3), and deterioration of
market conditions and disinvestment by both financial institutions and
property owners who stop maintaining the property (Stage 4).

Evidence

of the final stage, property abandonment, can already be seen in certain
parts of Roxbury.
Other findings described in this study are as follows:
• Attempts have been made by Boston city officials and local
community groups to seek a resolution to the financing problem. A
multi-million dollar fund has been established by the
Fleet/Norstar Group, Shawmut Bank and Baybank for the purposes of
home purchases and home repair financing in Roxbury, Dorchester
and Mattapan.
• A moratorium on foreclosures has been put in place by the
Attorney General to provide a period of time to review the loan
contracts. Community groups are advocating that traditional terms
and interest rates be applied to these loans, reducing the burden
to the borrowers.
• Mortgage companies became regulated in Massachusetts on January
1, 1992. Temporary licenses have been issued to existing mortgage
companies while the Massachusetts Banking Commission investigates
the solvency and business practices of the mortgage companies. At
the time of this writing, thirty-three companies have had their
licenses suspended because they have not met the new regulations.
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• Finally, those individuals who have abused the unregulated
environment and violated consumer protection laws have had
complaints charged against them by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts. Several individuals have been convicted and are
currently serving jail sentences.
RECOMMENDATIONS
These findings show that Boston's major banks have not met the
needs of low- and moderate-income residents as required by the Community
Reinvestment Act.

The economic recession of the early 1990s makes it

doubtful that this situation will change in the near future without
strict enforcement by bank regulators.

Additionally, the current

structure of the banking industry, and the recent expansion of wholesale
mortgage banks that purchase loans originated by mortgage companies
provides evidence that mortgage company activities will continue to grow
in the future.

If regulated banks continue to place their resources

into loan purchases rather than branch offices, community needs will
likely remain unmet.

The current status of the industry policing itself

does not appear to be effective.

Perhaps it is time to place CRA

enforcement requirements beyond the banking industry.
The current structure of the banking industry allows abuse which
may well continue in the future.

Mortgage companies do not replenish

their funds through deposits in the same manner as banks.

Mortgage

companies are able to offer loans through a line of credit they maintain
with banks.

Home loans originated by mortgage companies are sold back

to banks that, in turn, sell many of the mortgages in the secondary
mortgage market.

The banks purchasing these mortgages do not review all

applications in the same manner they would if they originated the loans.
Bank examiners select a few loans as a sample for review, but complete
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information on interest rates, especially over 18-percent, has not
always been provided by the mortgage company (Marantz 1991).

Those

mortgages sold in the secondary mortgage market that default are insured
by the federal government .
insulated position.

Under this structure, banks enjoy an

They have not been held responsible for usurious

lending practices because the mortgage companies originated the loans.
Loans sold in the secondary mortgage market and subsequently default are
insured by the federal government.

It appears that the banks have

little to lose in this situation.
In the interests of economic stability, it is desirable to
financially support the banking industry against major losses.

Yet this

author believes that the taxpayer has a right to expect banks to promote
industry standards in return for the safety net the federal government
provides the banking industry.

This includes meeting the obligations of

the Community Reinvestment Act to provide products and services to lowand moderate-income households, as well as reviewing the loan
applications originated by mortgage companies.
If banks were to be held culpable for the destabilizing effect
that, in fact, they are promoting by financially supporting the
hardlenders, it seems likely they would review the loan contracts more
thoroughly as they purchase the loans from mortgage companies.

Banks

could simply refuse to purchase questionable mortgage company loans.
Such efforts would serve to promote industry standards and prevent
usurious interest rates and the subsequent foreclosures that result from
very burdensome debts.

These efforts might serve to reduce the number
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of future foreclosures and might add a few jobs to the local economy as
well.
A few of the mortgage companies operating in Roxbury, Dorchester
and Kattapan have abused the unregulated environment.

Recent

legislation, however, serves to provide safeguards for borrowers in the
future.

Perhaps Congress should consider regulating mortgage companies

operating throughout the United States to prevent future abuse of the
unregulated environment.
As of this writing, the residents of Roxbury, Dorchester and

Kattapan are still without a steady supply of funds for the purchase and
improvement of homes.

As previously mentioned, Shawmut Bank, Baybank

and Fleet/Norstar Group have recently established a multi-million dollar
fund to meet the neighborhood needs.
solution, however.

This seems to be a short-term

One wonders if the fund will be replenished when the

original monies are disbursed, or if the neighborhoods will be left to
deteriorate once again.

The future stability of the area requires a

steady flow of capital.
F~~ER~EARCH

This investigation stimulates questions for future research.

For

example, many of the residents of Roxbury, Dorchester and Kattapan are
low-income households.

For some, the costs of homeownership might be

too burdensome to establish homeownership as a goal.

But, for those

homeowners who purchased their homes twenty or thirty years ago, and
have carefully managed their resources to maintain their property, what
programs need to be made available and/or expanded to these individuals?
Programs for consideration might include reverse equity plans, or low-
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interest home improvement loans which can provide needed capital to
homeowners with less risk of foreclosure.
Finally, it would be of interest to learn the extent to which
victimized homeowners were helped by state or federal programs to enable
them to become homeowners in the first place.

Historically, such home

purchase programs have been established without concern for continuing
maintenance responsibilities.

Information about the needs of assisted

households could lead to recommendations for ongoing support for lowand moderate-income homebuyers/owners.

Within this context, it would

also be of interest to learn the costs associated with a long-term
government commitment to low- and moderate-income homeowners.

It would

be useful to compare the costs of such support programs against the
costs to the taxpayer for mortgages in default because of very
burdensome debts.

While these questions are beyond the scope of this

research, determining the answers might help to solve some of the
problems of housing in Boston.

GLOSSARY
Hardlenders:

A colloquialism used by the Boston media and community
organizers to refer to the mortgage companies
packaging loan products that are typically short-term,
very high interest rate debts. The term
differentiates these lenders from other unregulated
mortgage companies whose products are less burdensome
to borrowers.

Regulated Banks:

This term refers to financial institutions that are
regulated by one or more of the four regulatory
agencies, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). Lenders under the
jurisdiction of these agencies include all banks,
savings and loans, and credit unions that provide home
mortgage loans.

Unregulated Hortgage Companies:
Refers to mortgage companies operating in an
unregulated environment. Most such mortgage companies
offer loans to borrowers through a line of credit
established with regulated banks. Although a few
unregulated mortgage companies are large enough to
remain independent of banks and sell their loans
directly into the secondary mortgage market, most rely
on the financial relationship with banks.
Usurious Interest Rates:
Are defined as interest rates in excess of 24-percent
annually.
Usurious Lenders: Are those lenders charging interest rates in excess of
24-percent annually.
Usury:

The act or practice of lending money at an exorbitant
or illegal rate of interest.
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